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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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December 6, Part 2 273<br />

Compilation <strong>of</strong> men-<strong>of</strong>-war in Far East, British, American,<br />

Japanese, Dutch, Russian. Also compilation <strong>of</strong> American men<strong>of</strong>-war<br />

in Pacifi c Fleet, with locations, <strong>and</strong> a list <strong>of</strong> American<br />

men-<strong>of</strong>-war in the Atlantic without locations.<br />

Admirals Ingersoll, Stark <strong>and</strong> the Secretary <strong>of</strong> the Navy were<br />

consulted <strong>and</strong> the Secretary directed that the information be<br />

compiled <strong>and</strong> delivered to him [Stimson] prior to 1000 Sunday,<br />

7 Dec. 11<br />

First 13 Parts <strong>of</strong> Japanese Reply<br />

Delivered to FDR<br />

Between October 1 <strong>and</strong> December 7, 1941, Kramer, attached<br />

to the Offi ce <strong>of</strong> Naval Intelligence in Washington, was on loan to<br />

OP-20-G, Offi ce <strong>of</strong> Naval Communications. He was a Japanese<br />

language student <strong>and</strong> headed the translation section <strong>of</strong> the communications<br />

security group, then made up <strong>of</strong> a staff <strong>of</strong> three<br />

civilian translators. Kramer reviewed their translations <strong>and</strong> did<br />

an occasional translation himself. He was also responsible for<br />

seeing that the decoded <strong>and</strong> translated intercepts were delivered<br />

to the authorized Navy personnel. As the volume <strong>of</strong> intercepts<br />

increased in the weeks before December 7, Kramer necessarily<br />

assumed more responsibility for organizing the intercepts with<br />

background material <strong>and</strong> assembling them for delivery. 12<br />

Before Beardall left for home at about 5:30 p.m. that Saturday<br />

afternoon, he turned over his post to the special deputy communication<br />

watch <strong>of</strong>fi cer, Lieutenant Lester Robert Schulz, on temporary<br />

assignment with the Offi ce <strong>of</strong> Naval Communications.<br />

He told Schulz “to remain there that night to receive [a] special<br />

11Ibid., part 19, pp. 3536–37. See also memor<strong>and</strong>um read into the record, Joint<br />

Committee, part 11, pp. 5247–54.<br />

12Ibid., part 33, pp. 848–52, Kramer testimony before the NCI, September 13,<br />

1944.

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