Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

December 6, Part 2 271
Th e Navy Department was operating on a diff erent schedule.
To keep in touch with developments, Admiral Wilkinson, chief
of the Offi ce of Naval Intelligence, “had set up a 24-hour watch
in the Far Eastern Section alone.” “[W]hen it appeared that
the Japanese advance in the China Sea was becoming more and
more critical,” he had established “a watch of the senior offi cers
of the Department, the heads of the branches, and the Assistant
Director” so that responsible offi cers were on duty “in rotation”
to cover the 24 hours each day. Admiral Beardall, himself, the
President’s naval aide, was on call. So was Captain Kramer. 5
Th erefore the Navy decoders and translators were on duty that
Saturday afternoon, even though this work was an Army responsibility
on even-numbered dates.
When Kramer stopped in at the department “at 3:00 on the
6th, the message was coming in . . . [which] turned out to be
a part of the [14-part Japanese] reply.” Th e Japanese government
was transmitting it in English so that their ambassadors in
Washington would not have to translate it before submitting it
to Secretary of State Hull. Th is made the task of the Navy cryptographers
somewhat easier. But the message was in “Purple;” it
still had to be decoded. Kramer waited and “held [his] team of
translators.” 6
Th e Navy cryptographers “turned to” 7 and began decoding
and translating. However, they were soon swamped by the
heavy work load. At about 3:00 p.m., they sent “an urgent call” to
the Army for help “and got some of the Army people back and
they assisted the Navy throughout the night of December 6th in
5Ibid., part 4, p. 1761, Wilkinson testimony before the Joint Committee,
December 17, 1946.
6 Ibid., part 33, p. 857, Kramer testimony before the NCI.
7 Ibid.