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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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270 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

Saturday afternoon, December 6. 1 After Comm<strong>and</strong>er Kramer<br />

delivered it to the Navy personnel on his list—by then it was<br />

mid-afternoon—he stopped by the Navy Department to make<br />

a fi nal check with the Teletype Watch to see whether there was<br />

anything apparently hot coming in. . . . In view <strong>of</strong> other developments<br />

that we [the United States] had seen taking place in<br />

the diplomatic traffi c <strong>and</strong> otherwise it was apparent things<br />

were shaping up to some sort <strong>of</strong> a crisis. 2<br />

Japan’s 14-part English-language reply to the U.S. “ultimatum”<br />

began to come in at Bainbridge intercept station on the west coast<br />

very early Saturday morning, December 6. Th e fi rst part reached<br />

there at 5:03 a.m. (8:03 a.m. Washington, D.C. time). From then<br />

until 8:52 a.m. (11:52 a.m. Washington, D.C. time), when the<br />

13th part came in, Bainbridge was busy intercepting <strong>and</strong> relaying<br />

the messages, by teletype, still in code, to Washington, D.C. 3 Th e<br />

fi rst 13 parts had all been received in Washington, D.C., by 2:51<br />

p.m. on December 6. Part 14 did not come in until more than 12<br />

hours later.<br />

In 1941, before the attack on <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>, most government<br />

<strong>of</strong>fi ces closed down at noon on Saturdays. “Th e War Department<br />

[cryptographic] unit at that time was observing normal <strong>of</strong>fi ce<br />

hours <strong>and</strong> secured from work at noon on Saturday, December 6,<br />

1941, with the intention <strong>of</strong> doing no work until 8:00 on Monday,<br />

December 8, 1941.” 4 Th erefore, just past noon, after decoding the<br />

“Pilot Message,” the Army closed up shop for the weekend.<br />

179th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation<br />

<strong>of</strong> the <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack. <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.:<br />

U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, 1946), part 12, pp. 238–39, Tokyo “Purple”<br />

message #901.<br />

2Ibid., part 33, p. 857, Kramer testimony before the NCI, September 13,<br />

1944.<br />

3Ibid., part 14, pp. 1413–15, exhibit No. 41.<br />

4Ibid., part 36, p. 66, Saff ord testimony at Hewitt Inquiry, May 21, 1945.

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