Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

13.
December 6, Part 2
First 13 Parts of Japan’s Reply
to U.S. Note of November 26
U.S. offi cials assumed the Japanese government had not been
bluffi ng when it wired its ambassadors in Washington setting
a deadline after which “things [were] automatically
going to happen” if they could not reach agreement in their negotiations
with the United States by November 29. Th us special
arrangements had been made to assure that our top offi cials in
Washington would receive promptly whatever reply the Japanese
might make to our November 26 note, the so-called “ultimatum.”
Th e director of Naval Intelligence was to be notifi ed immediately;
a special weekend phone line connected Naval Intelligence
and the State Department, and a special deputy communication
watch offi cer was assigned duty at the White House on the evening
of December 6.
Th e “Pilot Message,” advising the Japanese ambassadors in
Washington to expect their government’s reply to the U.S. note
shortly, had been intercepted, decoded, translated, and delivered
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