Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

December 6, Part 1 267
had “now received assurance of American armed support” in three
eventualities: (1) if the British were obliged to forestall a Japanese
landing on the Isthmus of Kra (Malayan Peninsula), or on any
other part of Siam, (2) if the Dutch Indies were attacked and
the British went to their defense, or (3) if the Japanese attacked
the British. Moreover, Brooke-Popham could “put plan in action
[without reference to London] if you [Brooke-Popham] have
good info Jap expedition advancing with apparent intention of
landing in Kra second if the Nips violate any part of Th ailand.”
Also if the Netherlands East Indies were attacked he should put
into operation the British-Dutch plans agreed upon. 47
Hart was dumbfounded at the news that the British had been
“assured of American armed support.” He had just agreed to send
four of his destroyers to join Phillips’s force. However, this news
from Singapore was apparently Hart’s fi rst intimation that the
United States had a defi nite commitment to support the British
or Dutch militarily if the Japanese should attack either of them
at Th ailand, the Isthmus of Kra, or the Netherlands East Indies.
Any such commitment would necessarily involve the Asiatic Fleet
under his command. Hart wired Washington for instructions. 48
47 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 10, pp. 5082–83; Creighton
testimony before the Joint Committee, quoting War Department London
telegram, relayed from Singapore to Manila December 7, Manila time.
48 Ibid., part 14, p. 1412, Exhibit No. 40.