Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

262 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
an inventory of 150 diff erent registered publications on that little
island where, you see, they had almost nothing” in the way
of defense. “And at that time,” in Saff ord’s view, “war was right
around the corner.” 34
As communications offi cer, Saff ord was responsible for safeguarding
the security of our lines of communications. “Intelligence”
was not within his purview; he could not convey to the fi eld his
judgment that “war was right around the corner.” However, the
safety of the “registered publications” on Wake, under the jurisdiction
of the Pacifi c Fleet, was one of his responsibilities. Th erefore,
Saff ord drafted a message for the fl eet’s commander-in-chief,
Kimmel, and for the information of the senior offi cers on Wake.
“In view of imminence of war,” it read, they were to “destroy all
registered publications except this system and current editions of
aircraft code and direction fi nder code.” 35 Before such a message
could go out, it had to be approved by Saff ord’s superior, Admiral
Noyes, director of Naval Communications. So Saff ord took his
draft to Noyes.
Noyes: “What do you mean by using such language as that?”
Saff ord: “Admiral, the war is just a matter of days, if not of
hours.”
Noyes: “You may think there is going to be a war, but I think
they are bluffi ng.”
Saff ord: “Well, Admiral, if all these publications on Wake are
captured we will never be able to explain it.”
Noyes then “rewrote the message and left out any reference
to Wake Island or the 150 publications exposed to capture, which
34Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 29, pp. 2398–99, Saff ord testimony
at APHB.
35Ibid.