Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

December 6, Part 1 261
fully appreciated at the time, for the cable directing the Japanese
embassy in Washington to cable “haruna” to Tokyo after destroying
their codes and code machines had only been intercepted,
decoded, and translated that very day. Th e next day we intercepted
transmissions of “haruna” from Portland and Panama.
On December 5 the Japanese consuls in Hollywood, Seattle, and
Vancouver (Canada) also cabled Tokyo “haruna.” Ottawa did the
same the following day. 31
Security of U.S. Communications
in Pacific in Jeopardy
In compliance with U.S. Pacifi c Fleet Operating Plan,
Rainbow No. Five, Admiral Kimmel had sent reinforcements to
the mid-Pacifi c islands under his command—Wake (1,994 miles
west of Pearl Harbor) 32 and Guam (located 1,334 miles farther
out in the midst of the Japanese mandated islands, 3,340 miles
west of Pearl Harbor). 33
In Washington, toward the end of the offi ce day on December 5,
one of the women employed in the Registered Publication Section
realized that the forces which had gone to Wake had taken with
them a lot of registered publications. Captain Saff ord, who was
in charge of the security section of the Navy’s Communications
Division, had warned Guam the day before to destroy all “secret
and classifi ed publications and other classifi ed matter.” Saff ord
now became concerned about Wake; he asked the persons in the
Registered Publication Section “to make a complete inventory”
of the sensitive materials there. One or two offi cers and a couple
of civilians in the Section worked on the assignment until about 1
o’clock in the morning. “[T]he next morning they gave [Saff ord]
31Ibid., part 5, p. 2077.
32 Ibid., part 12, p. 339, table of distances.
33Distances as cited in the Encylopaedia Britannica (1955), “Guam” entry, vol.
10, p. 929.