Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

260 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
in Washington on December 6. 27 Th is intercept reported movements
of U.S. naval ships in and out of Pearl Harbor. No hint of
its contents, or of its existence, was relayed to the commanders
there.
Japanese Offices Worldwide
Acknowledge Code-Destruct Order
Japanese diplomatic offi ces all around the world seemed to be
preparing for an emergency. On December 3 we had translated a
Tokyo message to the Japanese embassy in Washington ordering
them to destroy all but one code machine and to burn all codes
but the one used with the surviving machine. When this had been
done the embassy was to cable one word to Tokyo: “haruna.” 28 On
delivering this intercept to FDR, his naval aide Beardall called it
to FDR’s attention. Th e president read it and asked, “Well, when
do you think it will happen?” In other words, when did he expect
war to break out? Beardall replied, “Most any time.” 29
On receipt of this intercept, a young offi cer, at Colonel
Bratton’s request, went by the Japanese embassy in Washington
during the night. He saw offi cials of the Japanese embassy actually
burning their code book and ciphers. On December 6, the Offi ce
of Naval Intelligence learned about this and reported to military
intelligence that the embassy had complied with the Tokyo order
to destroy its codes. 30
Also on December 3, SIS began picking the word “haruna” in
messages being transmitted by the Japanese consuls in New York,
New Orleans, and Havana. Its signifi cance may not have been
27 Ibid., part 5, p. 2082.
28 Ibid., part 12, p. 215. Tokyo to Washington #867.
29 Ibid., part 11, p. 5284, Beardall testimony before the Joint Committee.
30 Ibid., part 8, p. 3780, memorandum on the stationery of the War Department
General Staff , Military Intelligence Division G-2, Washington, dated
December 6, 1941.