Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

December 6, Part 1 259
Takagi, Ando, Yamamoto and others leave by plane within the
next couple of days.” 22 When delivered to the Navy recipients of
MAGIC, a penciled footnote identifi ed Terasaki, second secretary
in the Japanese embassy, as “head of Japanese espionage in
Western Hemisphere. He and his assistants,” the note read, “are
being sent to South America.” 23
Also on December 6, we translated two other “Purple” messages
dealing with the destruction of codes at the Japanese embassy
in Washington. One message from the embassy in Washington
advised Tokyo that the codes had been destroyed but requested
permission, “since the U.S.-Japanese negotiations are still continuing[,]”
to delay “the destruction of the one code machine.” 24
Th e wire from Tokyo explained that the embassy was “to burn
one set” of code machines but “for the time being to continue the
use of the other.” 25
Th at same afternoon we intercepted and decrypted another
short Japanese message from Tokyo reminding the embassy
in Washington of the importance of “preserving secrecy” with
respect to the “aide memoire,” the 14-part reply to our note of
November 26. “[B]e absolutely sure not to use a typist or any
other person” in its preparation. 26
Still another signifi cant Japanese intercept from Honolulu to
Tokyo was read that day. Th is message, transmitted in a code not
yet decrypted, had been picked up in San Francisco on November
18 and airmailed to the SIS in Washington on or about November
21. It could be decoded and translated only after the cipher was
solved on or about December 3, but it was available to our people
22Ibid., p. 234.
23Ibid., part 9, p. 4201. Note added by courier Kramer for the benefi t of Navy
recipients, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee.
24Ibid., part 12, pp. 236.
25Ibid., p. 237.
26Ibid., part 12, p. 245.