Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

258 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Indies. Th e Dutch were much alarmed at the proximity of such
large concentrations of Japanese troops.
On December 5, U.S. Military Attaché Merle-Smith in
Australia had sent information about these convoys to General
MacArthur in the Philippines and to General Short in Hawaii.
Th e fact that Japanese troops were on the move in the southwest
Pacifi c was taken as confi rmation in Hawaii of the word they
had received from Washington: that the immediate threat of a
Japanese strike was to southeast Asia. 20
Intercepted Messages from Italy,
Japanese Embassy (Washington), Tokyo,
Indicate War is Imminent
In Europe the three Axis Powers—Germany, Italy, and
Japan—were following the diplomatic events unfolding in
Washington. We learned on December 6, that Premier Benito
Mussolini had told the Japanese ambassador to Italy that he had
“been carefully watching the progress of the Japanese-U.S. talks.”
Mussolini charged the United States with “utter bull-headedness”
and FDR with being of a “meddlesome nature.” Mussolini told
the ambassador that he was in complete sympathy with Japan’s
desire to create “a New Order in East Asia.” Th e ambassador
then asked, “[S]hould Japan declare war on the United States and
Great Britain . . . would Italy do likewise immediately?” Mussolini
replied: “Of course.” 21
A December 5 message addressed to the Japanese ambassadors
in Washington from Tokyo, also decoded and translated in
Washington on December 6, provided one more clue to Japan’s
intentions. Th is cable was short: “Will you please have Terasaki,
20Ibid., part 34, pp. 59–61, Lieutenant Robert H. O’Dell testimony before
Clarke Inquiry, October 6, 1944.
21Ibid., part 12, pp. 228–29.