Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

December 6, Part 1 257
Fleet in the Philippines was received in the Navy Department in
Washington at about 8:00 a.m. that same morning. It reported
that two Japanese convoys consisting of 35 ships escorted by eight
cruisers and 20 destroyers had been sighted south of Indochina
heading toward Malaya. 16 Th ese convoys were dangerously close
to the line drawn by the ADB powers (American/Dutch/British)
and designated in their secret April 1941 Singapore meeting as
the limit beyond which the Japanese could not advance without
inviting “active military counter-action.” 17 Both convoys were
south of the southern tip of French Indochina, so they had already
crossed latitude 10° North. Since they were heading west toward
the Isthmus of Kra, and had arrived at longitudes 106.20° East
and 105° East, they were expected soon to pass the critical northsouth
line, 100° East. Hart’s message also reported “30 ships
and one large cruiser” sighted by his scouting force anchored in
Camranh Bay off the southeast coast of Indochina, a couple of
hundred miles north of Saigon (since renamed Ho Chi Minh
City).
Shortly after Hart’s cable reached the Navy Department, the
State Department received a message from U.S. Ambassador
John G. Winant in London confi rming that these convoys were
converging on waters the ADB powers considered inviolable. 18 It
was not clear, however, just where they were headed. Th e British
undersecretary of foreign aff airs, Sir Alexander Cadogan, was
“uncertain as to whether destination of parties is Kra [Malaya] or
Bangkok [Th ailand].” 19 But there could be no doubt that Japanese
ships and troops were moving into position for some operation
in the vicinity of the Malaysian Peninsula and/or the Dutch East
16 Ibid., part 17, p. 2485.
17 Ibid., part 15, p. 1564, ADB (April 1941) Conversations.
18 Ibid., part 14, p. 1246. See also ibid., part 2, p. 493.
19 Ibid., part 14, p. 1247. See also ibid., part 2, p. 494.