Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

December 6, Part 1 255
Message.” 9 By 2:00 it had been decoded, translated, and typed up
in fi nished form by the SIS men. 10 Presumably the Japanese code
clerks in their embassy were decoding and typing this same message
at the same time as were our Army decoders.
Th is “Pilot Message” stated that the Japanese government
had “deliberated deeply” with respect to the U.S. note and had
drawn up a long 14-part memorandum that would be sent to
the ambassadors separately. Th e reply would be transmitted in
English, so it would only have to be decoded before it could be
submitted to Hull. Th e situation was “extremely delicate,” Tokyo
warned. When the ambassadors received the long memorandum,
they should keep it secret for the time being. Th ey would be wired
special instructions separately “concerning the time of presenting
this memorandum to the United States.” 11
About 2:00 Saturday afternoon, as soon as the “Pilot Message”
was ready, SIS sent it to the Military Intelligence Division of the
War Department’s general staff . From Military Intelligence it
was distributed at about 3:00, either by Colonel Rufus S. Bratton,
then chief of Military Division’s Far Eastern Section, or by one
of his assistants, to the Army’s list of recipients—Hull, Stimson,
Marshall, and Chief of War Plans Division Leonard T. Gerow
(G-2). 12
Th e Navy courier, responsible for delivering Japanese intercepts
to the White House and the others on the Navy’s list, was
Lieutenant Commander A.D. Kramer. Th e White House was
usually fi rst on Kramer’s list and apparently Admiral Beardall,
naval aide to the president at the White House, received the
9Ibid., part 12, pp. 238–39.
10Ibid., part 9, p. 4510, testimony of Colonel Rufus Bratton before the Joint
Committee.
11Ibid., part 12, pp. 238–39.
12Ibid., part 9, pp. 4508–10, 4512–13, 4536, 4574, Bratton testimony before
the Joint Committee.