Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

December 6, Part 1 253
result of their access to MAGIC and other sources, that a clash
with Japan was at hand. Th eir constitutional responsibility for
national defense obligated them to protect this country and its
citizens and to see to it that, insofar as possible, U.S. forces, wherever
stationed, were properly provisioned, prepared, and alerted.
Th eir constitutional responsibility did not call for inviting foreign
intervention or defending other nations.
“Pilot Message” Alerts Washington to
Expect Japan’s Reply to U.S. “Ultimatum”
Ever since November 26, when Washington offi cialdom had
rejected the Japanese proposal for a modus vivendi, we had been
anxiously awaiting Tokyo’s reply. We knew from reading cable
intercepts that the Japanese considered our statement “humiliating”
and that relations between our two countries were considered
to be “de facto ruptured.” It was clear to us that U.S.-Japanese
relations were at an impasse. But we had also read their government’s
instructions to the two Japanese ambassadors to keep on
talking and not “to give the impression that the negotiations are
broken off .” So we knew their interest in continuing to meet with
Secretary of State Hull was merely for the sake of appearances; it
did not mean a change in their deadline. 3
On Friday, December 5, Rear Admiral Th eodore S. Wilkinson,
Director of the Offi ce of Naval Intelligence, had set up “a 24-hour
watch in the Far Eastern Section” and had established “a watch
of the senior offi cers of the Department.” 4 According to Navy
Captain William A. Heard, then in charge of the foreign branch,
Offi ce of Naval Intelligence, “Th ere was an elaborate arrangement
for prompt notifi cation to the Director of Naval Intelligence of
3Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, p. 195, Tokyo to Washington
“Purple” message #844.
4Ibid., part 4, p. 1761, Wilkinson testimony.