Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

252 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
October 15, 1941, he found that it had been reduced to a factgathering
agency and the Navy’s War Plans Division had assumed
the responsibility for analyzing the information that came in. 2
Th e Navy’s top offi cer, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO),
was responsible for keeping the Navy’s commander-in-chief, the
president, informed. And orders to the Navy’s fi eld commanders
were sent out by the CNO.
Step by step, as data journeyed through channels, from the
technical specialists who collected it to the offi cers with training
and experience who interpreted it, it became meaningful “intelligence.”
“Intelligence” formed an extremely important component
of the total 1941 picture. Th e Army’s chief of staff , General
Marshall, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark,
relied on the available “intelligence” when advising their fi eld
commanders on military strategy. Th e top administration offi -
cials, that is the secretaries of State, War, Navy, and the president
himself, also strove to keep abreast of current “intelligence.” In
1941, this meant keeping up to date on the Japanese position
through the diplomatic cables and other sources.
In the course of assembling, interpreting, and analyzing the
data available, the most important “intelligence” was channeled
to the men at the top. Even though each technical specialist
involved in the complicated procedure was familiar with only a
small segment of the total picture, the president and his top civilian
and military advisers, who had the fi nal responsibility for the
“common defense” of the nation and for resolving diplomatic and
political diff erences, had a bird’s-eye view of the overall situation.
Th ey were also provided with the country’s most perceptive
military advice. By December 6, they were well aware, as a
2 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, 1946), part 36, pp. 229–31, testimony of
Admiral Wilkinson, June 5, 1945, before the Hewitt Inquiry.