Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

December 6, Part 1 251
usually in the hands of “War Plans” or “Operations” divisions.
Final policy decisions were then made on the basis of the diplomatic
and political situation by the government’s administrative
offi cials, the president and his cabinet, after taking into consideration
the advice of the Army’s chief of staff and the chief of naval
operations.
Th e various specialists cooperated. But at the same time they
were protective of the prerogatives of their own offi ce or division,
and anxious to prevent outsiders from invading their department’s
turf. Th us the jurisdiction of each offi ce or division was
carefully prescribed. To avoid confl ict, each was careful to follow
channels. “Communications” collected data; “Intelligence” analyzed
and interpreted it; orders to fi eld offi cers, in line with the
administration’s policy decisions, went out from “War Plans” or
“Operations.” Although the system usually functioned smoothly,
its operation was sometimes disturbed as changes were made in
procedure and personnel.
In the Army, the Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) collected
information and transmitted it to Army Intelligence (G-2). Th e
War Plans Division (G-5) formulated plans under the direction
of the Army chief of staff (ACS). Th e president, the commanderin-chief,
was responsible for overall policy. But orders to the fi eld
were issued by the chief of staff , “the immediate advisor of the
Secretary of War” and “the Commanding General of the Field
Forces.” 1
In the Navy, the Offi ce of Naval Communications collected
data. Traditionally, the Offi ce of Naval Intelligence (ONI) had
had the responsibility for collating, analyzing, and disseminating
this information to offi cers in the fi eld. However, when Rear
Admiral Th eodore S. Wilkinson became director of ONI on
1 Mark Skinner Watson, Th e War Department: Chief of Staff : Prewar Plans and
Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Historical Division,
1950), p. 64.