Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

250 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Many persons, each with his or her own expertise, played
a role in the process of collecting the raw data that go to provide
“intelligence.” Th ere were code specialists, communications
specialists, security specialists, decoders, translators, and couriers.
Th ere were code clerks who listened to foreign radio broadcasts
and could decipher Morse code, linguists familiar with Japanese,
and radio technicians who could determine the location of naval
vessels and military units by intersecting radio beacons. Th ere were
others at our various stations all over the world who picked cable
intercepts out of the air and transmitted them to Washington.
Each was familiar with only a small part of the total picture. No
single person had access to all this information. Few of the many
specialists were suffi ciently aware of the broad picture to be able
to comprehend the signifi cance of the data they accumulated.
And no one had any reason to feel a sense of urgency because no
one knew what was going to happen on December 7.
Th e responsibility for collecting, analyzing, disseminating,
and employing information was divided among various offi ces
and divisions of the military and the administration, each with
its own specialized experts. Roughly speaking, data was collected
by technical personnel in “communications.” Raw data was then
integrated and analyzed by specialists in “intelligence” offi ces or
divisions, persons who had the training, experience, background,
and knowledge of policy suffi cient to sift the wheat from the
chaff , to recognize what was pertinent and what was not, to
analyze and interpret it, and to decide what information should
be disseminated and to whom. Th ese “intelligence” specialists
needed to understand not only military operations, the defensive
and off ensive capabilities of our forces and of our potential allies
and enemies, but also the diplomatic situation and government
policy.
Once the raw data collected was converted into “intelligence,”
other specialists were responsible for disseminating it and issuing
commands to the fi eld commanders. Th is responsibility was