Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

12.
December 6, Part 1
Collecting “Intelligence”
and Determining Policy
With the perspective of hindsight, it is easy to spot the signifi
cant clues that should have given warning that the
Japanese might attack Pearl Harbor. Out of fairness to the
participants in the drama that was unfolding in 1941, however,
we should keep in mind the situation as it appeared to them. A
mass of information was coming into Washington in many forms
from all over the world. Bits and pieces of information came from
various sources—from diplomatic contacts, from cable intercepts,
including MAGIC, from our military and naval attachés, from
direct observations, overfl ights, radio direction fi ndings, and so
on. Much of it was not in English. And much of this foreignlanguage
material was in code as well. We were able to decode,
translate, and read a great deal of that, although not all, quite
promptly. Th e coded cable traffi c alone was extremely heavy. Th us
the amount of this material that was available toward the end of
1941 was almost overwhelming.
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