Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

246 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Confirmation from Batavia, NEI, of
Significance of Japan’s “Winds Code”
Th e naval attaché in Batavia, Netherlands East Indies, also
picked up the Japanese “Winds Code” setup message and notifi
ed Washington “deferred priority” on December 4, 6:21 a.m.
Greenwich time (December 4, 1:21 a.m. Washington time). Th e
attaché advised the United States that “Japan will notify her consuls
of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at
end” (italics added). Th en the cable quoted the special weather
words, each with its hidden meaning. 16
Th e “Winds Execute” picked up in Cheltenham, Maryland,
on December 4 was open to several interpretations. It could have
indicated simply that Japanese relations with the nations mentioned
would be in danger; that Japanese negotiations would be
discontinued; that diplomatic relations would be broken off ; or
that actual war was imminent. Th us Batavia’s explicit interpretation,
that the transmission of a “Winds Execute” would forebode
war, lent credence to Saff ord’s and Kramer’s interpretation that
it was actually a portent of war. However, since the cable from
Batavia had not been classifi ed URGENT, it was not decrypted
immediately, but held for the December 4–5 nightshift of Army’s
G-2, Intelligence Division. When we fi nally read it on the morning
of December 5, it was “old hat,” for we had already picked up
the “Winds Execute.”
The Navy’s December 5 View of
the U.S.-Japanese Situation
When Navy Director of War Plans Turner heard from
Admiral Noyes that a “Winds Execute” referring to a break in
16 Ibid., part 9, p. 4214, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee. See
also ibid., part 18, p. 3350. #031030 (5 Dec. 1941) from ALUSNA, Batavia
(Th orpe).