Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Further Indications of Impending Japanese Action 245
acknowledge receipt of these instructions, the embassy was to
cable Tokyo “in plain language . . . the one word SETUJU.” When
the code machine had actually been destroyed the embassy was to
wire Tokyo, also in plain language, “HASSO.” 13 Th us communications
in code between the Embassy in London and Tokyo were
being shut down.
Some in U.S. intelligence realized that this was what Japan
had been preparing for when it set up the “Winds Code.” Radio
reception in those days was not reliable. Routine Japanese news
and weather broadcasts, into which Japan inserted the special
weather words with their secret meanings, could not usually be
heard in the countries surrounding the Pacifi c. But due to freak
atmospheric conditions, they “could be heard . . . in the North
Atlantic Ocean, the British Isles and Western Europe.” Th us
the primary reason for sending the “Winds Execute” must have
been to notify the Japanese ambassador in London, after his code
machine had been disposed of, that war with England and the
United States was coming. “[T]his was the only way that Tokyo
could get news to him secretly.” 14
Th at same day we intercepted a December 4 cable from the
Japanese ambassador in Berlin to Tokyo. Berlin was asking Tokyo
to arrange, “[i]n case of evacuation” from London, for the transfer
to Berlin of certain embassy personnel. Why would the Japanese
ambassador in Berlin anticipate the evacuation of the Japanese
embassy in London, unless he expected Japan and Great Britain
soon to be at war with each other? 15
13 Ibid., part 12, p. 209.
14 Ibid., part 8, p. 3585, Saff ord statement prepared for Joint Committee.
15 Ibid., part 12, p. 234.