Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

244 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
study that had “never constituted an authorized program of the
Government.” 10
Stimson continued,
While their publication will doubtless be of gratifi cation to
our potential enemies and a possible source of impairment and
embarrassment to our national defense, the chief evil of their
publication is the revelation that there should be among us any
group of persons so lacking in appreciation of the danger that
confronts the country.
He denounced those who were “so wanting in loyalty and
patriotism to their government that they would be willing to take
and publish such papers.” Stimson “declined to answer questions
or enlarge upon it, but indicated that more would be announced
after he had completed the task . . . of fi nding out how the ‘leak’
occurred.” 11
Japan Anticipates a Break with England
and the United States
On December 3 the Japanese ambassadors in Washington
notifi ed Tokyo by cable (which we decoded and translated on
December 5) that the indications were that “some joint military
action between Great Britain and the United States, with or
without a declaration of war is a defi nite certainty in the event of
an occupation [by Japan] of Th ailand.” 12
Also on December 5 we read a December 1 message from
Tokyo to the Japanese embassy in London: “Please discontinue
the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately.” To
10 Mark Skinner Watson, Th e War Department: Chief of Staff : Prewar Plans and
Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Historical Division,
1950), p. 359.
11 New York Times, December 6, 1941 p. 3.
12 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, p. 227.