Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

242 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
as the Chinese were eager to defend the Burma Road . . . the
possibility of a Chinese attack in Indochina as a means of preventing
Japan’s attacking the Burma Road from Indochina
could not be excluded.
Hull responded that he had “never heard before that Japan’s
troop movements into northern Indochina were for the purpose
of defense against Chinese attack.” Th is “was the fi rst time that
he knew that Japan was on the defensive in Indochina.” Hull
sounded sarcastic.
Th e ambassadors said the Japanese were “alarmed over
increasing naval and military preparations of the ABCD powers
in the southwest Pacifi c area.” Th ey said that “an airplane of
one of those countries had recently fl own over Formosa,” then
Japanese territory.
Nevertheless, Kurusu said, the Japanese government was “very
anxious to reach an agreement with this [U.S.] Government,” and
it felt we should be “willing to agree to discontinue aid to China
as soon as conversations between China and Japan were initiated.”
Hull countered by bringing up the aid Japan was giving
Hitler. Kurusu asked “in what way was Japan aiding Hitler.” Hull
replied, “by keeping large forces of this country and other countries
immobilized in the Pacifi c area.” 7 At this point the Japanese
ambassador said under his breath, “[T]his isn’t getting us anywhere.”
Nevertheless, the conversation continued. Th e secretary
and the two ambassadors recapitulated their respective positions
more or less as they had done many times before—with respect to
U.S. aid to China, the presence of Japanese troops in Indochina,
Japan’s desire for oil, and the attitude of the United States toward
supplying that oil.
Hull criticized Japan’s “bellicose” slogans and the “malignant
campaign conducted [in Japan] through the offi cially controlled
7 Ibid., pp. 781–82, Joseph W. Ballantine report of December 5 meeting
between Hull and the Japanese ambassadors.