Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

240 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
the day before at a session of the entire Japanese Privy Council.
Furthermore, Domei asserted, the document
cannot serve as a basis of Japanese-American negotiations
henceforth. Hull’s statement means that the United States is
still scheming to impose on Japan the provisions of old and
obsolete principles, which are incompatible with the actual Far
Eastern conditions, even of bygone days. 2
Japanese Expeditionary Force
in the Southwest Pacific
Th e Dutch and British, with possessions in the southwest
Pacifi c, were concerned that huge concentrations of Japanese
forces were assembling and apparently preparing to move in their
direction. Th e commander-in-chief of all Dutch naval forces, stationed
in London since the German invasion of the Netherlands
in May 1940, “had received information that the Japanese were
concentrating an expeditionary force in the Pelew [Palau] Islands”
in the Carolines, only about 600 miles northwest of Dutch New
Guinea. 3 Th e Dutch in London conferred with Anthony Eden,
secretary of state for foreign aff airs. Th ey were seeking some type
of “a joint declaration of a defense zone by the United States or
Great Britain” to assist their defense against the Japanese. 4 Eden
cabled Lord Halifax, the British ambassador in Washington,
setting forth “the British view that the time has now come for
immediate cooperation with the Dutch East Indies by mutual
understanding. . . .Th is of course relates to the matter of defense
2 New York Times, December 5, 1941, pp. 1, 4.
3 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers,
1941, vol. 2: Th e Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Offi ce, 1956), vol. 4, p. 717.
4 Ibid., pp. 717–19.