Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
11. Further Indications of Impending Japanese Action Tokyo: “Utterly Impossible for Japan to Accept” U.S. Terms Page One of Th e New York Times reported on December 5 that Tokyo “was struck as by a bombshell . . . with the revelation of the substance of the Japanese-American negotiations.” Japan’s government-controlled news agency, Domei, had announced, “It is utterly impossible for Japan to accept the stipulations of the American document” presented to the two Japanese ambassadors on November 26 by Secretary of State Hull. Domei was owned by the Japanese government and “carefully controlled by the Japanese Government.” Any Domei report was “simply what the Japanese Government wanted to have passed on to the public.” 1 Th e terms of the U.S. document were not reported. However, according to the story, “a lively debate” had taken place 1 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, 1946), part 2, p. 688, Testimony of Joseph C. Grew, U.S. Ambassador to Japan. 239
240 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy the day before at a session of the entire Japanese Privy Council. Furthermore, Domei asserted, the document cannot serve as a basis of Japanese-American negotiations henceforth. Hull’s statement means that the United States is still scheming to impose on Japan the provisions of old and obsolete principles, which are incompatible with the actual Far Eastern conditions, even of bygone days. 2 Japanese Expeditionary Force in the Southwest Pacific Th e Dutch and British, with possessions in the southwest Pacifi c, were concerned that huge concentrations of Japanese forces were assembling and apparently preparing to move in their direction. Th e commander-in-chief of all Dutch naval forces, stationed in London since the German invasion of the Netherlands in May 1940, “had received information that the Japanese were concentrating an expeditionary force in the Pelew [Palau] Islands” in the Carolines, only about 600 miles northwest of Dutch New Guinea. 3 Th e Dutch in London conferred with Anthony Eden, secretary of state for foreign aff airs. Th ey were seeking some type of “a joint declaration of a defense zone by the United States or Great Britain” to assist their defense against the Japanese. 4 Eden cabled Lord Halifax, the British ambassador in Washington, setting forth “the British view that the time has now come for immediate cooperation with the Dutch East Indies by mutual understanding. . . .Th is of course relates to the matter of defense 2 New York Times, December 5, 1941, pp. 1, 4. 3 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1941, vol. 2: Th e Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, 1956), vol. 4, p. 717. 4 Ibid., pp. 717–19.
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11.<br />
Further Indications <strong>of</strong><br />
Impending Japanese Action<br />
Tokyo: “Utterly Impossible for<br />
Japan to Accept” U.S. Terms<br />
Page One <strong>of</strong> Th e New York Times reported on December 5<br />
that Tokyo “was struck as by a bombshell . . . with the revelation<br />
<strong>of</strong> the substance <strong>of</strong> the Japanese-American negotiations.”<br />
Japan’s government-controlled news agency, Domei, had<br />
announced, “It is utterly impossible for Japan to accept the stipulations<br />
<strong>of</strong> the American document” presented to the two Japanese<br />
ambassadors on November 26 by Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Hull. Domei<br />
was owned by the Japanese government <strong>and</strong> “carefully controlled<br />
by the Japanese Government.” Any Domei report was “simply<br />
what the Japanese Government wanted to have passed on to<br />
the public.” 1 Th e terms <strong>of</strong> the U.S. document were not reported.<br />
However, according to the story, “a lively debate” had taken place<br />
1 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation<br />
<strong>of</strong> the <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack. <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.:<br />
U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, 1946), part 2, p. 688, Testimony <strong>of</strong> Joseph<br />
C. Grew, U.S. Ambassador to Japan.<br />
239