Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

236 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Halifax that he hoped that, if he did contact the Emperor, “the
three-Power warning might be postponed until he had had an
answer.” 43
British Forces in Southeast Asia Told
of Promised U. S. Armed Support
On December 5 in southeast Asia (December 4 in the United
States)
the Dominions received from the United Kingdom Government
information that it had received assurance of armed support
from the United States (a) if Britain found it necessary either
to forestall a Japanese landing in the Kra Isthmus or to occupy
part of the isthmus as a counter to Japanese violation of any
other part of Th ailand; (b) if Japan attacked the Netherlands
East Indies and Britain at once went to their support; (c) if
Japan attacked British territory. 44
Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, British commander-in-chief
in the Far East stationed in Singapore, had fi nally received the
authority he had been requesting; he was free to launch “Matador,”
the operation intended to forestall a Japanese landing on the Kra
Isthmus. However, London’s instructions were worded in such
a way as to require that he withhold any action until he was
absolutely “sure that a Japanese expedition was making for the
Isthmus of Kra.” Such a delay would mean that “the chances of
its [a British operation] succeeding were greatly reduced, for it
would be too late to take action.” 45
43Ibid. 44Lionel Wigmore, Th e Japanese Th rust (Canberra: Australian War Memorial,
1957), p. 109.
45S. Woodburn Kirby, Th e War Against Japan, vol. 1: Th e Loss of Singapore
(London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Offi ce, 1957), p. 175.