Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Signifi cant Information Known in Washington 235
that he was acting in the interest of American defence, and not
just following a British lead. 40
FDR “had not given up all hope of a temporary agreement
with the Japanese.” He led Halifax to believe that
Mr. Kurusu had let him know indirectly that an approach
to the Emperor might still secure a truce, and even lead to a
settlement between Japan and China. Mr. Kurusu’s plan was
that the President should try to act as an “introducer” between
China and Japan with a view to their dealing directly with each
other.
Roosevelt suggested that the “lines of settlement” in such an
agreement “might be the withdrawal of the bulk of Japanese
troops from Indo-China, and a similar withdrawal from North
China on an agreed timetable.” 41
FDR also told Halifax that the Japanese would have to have
“some economic relief.” Actually, he said, he “did not put too
much importance on Mr. Kurusu’s approach, but he could not
miss even the chance of a settlement.” Besides FDR believed “his
own case [that the U.S. was negotiating in sincerity with Japan]
would be strengthened if he had been in communication with the
Emperor.” 42
Th ere was “some danger,” Halifax believed, “in postponing
the warning.” He even “suggested that the communication to
the Emperor might serve as a defi nite warning.” Th e president
agreed but said he would decide on December 6, “after getting
the Japanese reply to his enquiries [concerning the Japanese
troop movements], whether to approach the Emperor.” FDR told
40 Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London:
Her Majesty’s Stationery Offi ce, 1962), pp. 187–88.
41 Ibid., p.188.
42 Ibid.