Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

234 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
FDR and British Ambassador Discuss
Warning Japanese Against Attacking
British Malaya and NEI
Roosevelt followed the Japanese situation closely, insofar
as it was revealed by the MAGIC intercepts he saw. 37 Judging
from the clues to Japan’s intentions revealed in the messages
we were intercepting, it was apparent the Japanese were preparing
to strike. “[T]he only question that remained was when and
where.” 38 Without revealing his reasons, on December 4 FDR
“asked Congressional leaders not to recess for more than three
days at a time.” 39 He was keeping the door open so that he could
address Congress should he decide events and public opinion
warranted it.
Late that evening, British Ambassador Lord Halifax called on
the president to express his government’s “very deep appreciation”
for his promise the evening before of “armed support.” Th e two
men discussed whether or not it would be advisable for the British,
Dutch, and the U.S. governments to issue jointly a “simultaneous
warning” to the Japanese against attacking Th ailand, Malaya, the
Dutch East Indies, or the Burma Road through Indochina. FDR
was “doubtful about including the Burma Road, but otherwise
agreed to the warning.” However, he did not believe the warning
should be a joint one. He
thought that each of the three Governments should give it
independently, and that the American warning should come
fi rst, since he wanted to assure opinion in the United States
37Henry M. Adams, Hopkins: A Biography (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons,
1977), p. 257.
38Ibid., p. 256.
39Ibid., p. 257.