Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Signifi cant Information Known in Washington 233
ambassadors in Washington how to dispose of their codes. Th e
key, or guide to deciphering the code, however, was to be kept
“until the last moment” and then sent to the Japanese ministry
in Mexico. 34
Tokyo to Ambassadors: Maintain Pretense
that Negotiations Continue
Also on December 4, the Navy translated the Japanese government’s
instructions to their ambassadors in Washington as to
how to quiet Roosevelt’s concern, as expressed in his December
2 press conference, over Japanese troop movements in Indochina.
Th e ambassadors were told to point out, while maintaining the
pretense that the negotiations were continuing, that the movements
in the southern part of the country, as well as in the north,
have been in response to “an unusual amount of activity by the
Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-French Indo China border.”
Th e movements, they maintained, “have in no way violated
the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint defense
agreement.” 35
Nevertheless, the Japanese ambassadors in Washington
were still concerned. If Japan’s troop movements into Indochina
continued, they feared the United States might take steps to
close down the Japanese consulates. So they wired Tokyo again:
“[C]onsideration should be given to steps to be taken in connection
with the evacuation of the Consuls.” 36
34 Ibid., p. 231.
35 Ibid., p. 224. Tokyo to Washington, #875.
36 Ibid., p. 227. Washington to Tokyo, #1243.