Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

232 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
when we decoded and translated it. It had been due “partly to
foresight,” the ability of Intelligence to put several clues together
so as to anticipate it. But our successful interception had also
been due to “the high quality of the Navy operators and receiving
apparatus at Cheltenham.” 31
Tokyo to Honolulu: Investigate “Ships in
Harbor;” Tokyo to Embassy: Destroy Codes
Also intercepted and translated on December 4, was a signifi -
cant J-l9 Tokyo-Honolulu cable. Honolulu was asked to “investigate
comprehensively the fl eet bases in the neighborhood of the
Hawaiian military reservation.” 32
Th e usual procedure for handling Japanese J-19 messages—
interception in Hawaii and airmailing to Washington as picked up,
still encrypted and untranslated—had been followed in this case.
As a result, it was not until two weeks after its transmission from
Tokyo that this cable was decoded and translated in Washington.
However, it was available there on December 4, well before the
attack. And it provided confi rmation of the “Ships in Harbor”
messages. 33 In light of the other intercepts, this new reminder
that the Japanese in Hawaii had our fl eet at Pearl Harbor under
close surveillance should have set off fl ashing lights and piercing
alarms among those in military intelligence, arousing them to
alert the commanders in Hawaii. Yet no hint of either the earlier
“Ships in Harbor” messages, or of this follow-up, was forwarded
to Pearl Harbor.
A “Purple” December 4 Tokyo cable added to the crisis
atmosphere in Washington. Th is cable instructed the Japanese
31Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, p. 3586, Saff ord testimony
before the Joint Committee.
32Ibid., part 12, p. 263.
33Ibid., part 12, pp. 261–63.