Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Signifi cant Information Known in Washington 231
beginning of working hours the next morning. In other words,
any message which comes in in deferred priority automatically
is not going to be considered a war warning, regardless of how
you stated it. 27
Saff ord’s third December 4 message was sent to Hart in
Manila, which lay on the fl ank of the route the Japanese convoys
were traveling. It ordered that the communications room be
“stripped of all secret and confi dential publications and papers
which in the hands of an enemy would be of disadvantage to the
United States.” 28
Th e fourth message was directed for action to the U.S. naval
attaches in Tokyo, Peiping, Bangkok, and Shanghai, with an information
copy to Hart. No copy of this message was sent to Kimmel
in Pearl Harbor. Th is message, also prompted by our receipt of
the “Winds Execute,” ordered our outposts in the western Pacifi c
to destroy secret and confi dential materials “which in the hands
of an enemy would be a disadvantage to the United States.” 29
Saff ord was proud of the Navy crew at Cheltenham for having
intercepted the vital “Winds Execute,” and he did not forget
them. In the midst of the growing tension, he took time to send
them a message: “Well done. Discontinue coverage of the target.”
A day or so later, he followed that up with a bouquet of roses, not
exactly the traditional gift for one man to give a group of men.
But “cryppies” (cryptologists) had the reputation for being odd
balls, and Saff ord was a “cryppy.” 30
Saff ord recognized that our interception of the “Winds
Execute” had been due partly to “good luck,” the fact that the
Japanese hadn’t transmitted it between November 15, when their
“Winds Code” setup message had gone out, and November 28,
27Ibid., part 29, p. 2398, Saff ord testimony before the APHB.
28Ibid., p. 2397, Serial No. 042018.
29Ibid., Serial No. 042019.
30Briggs interview, August 14, 1988, by Bettina B. Greaves.