Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

230 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
fi rst message ordered Guam (more than 3,000 miles west of
Hawaii) and Samoa (2,260 miles south and west of Hawaii) to
destroy certain codes immediately and to substitute a new code,
RIP 66, for RIP 65, then in use. It was sent Priority to Kimmel at
Pearl Harbor, Hart in Manila, the commandants of their respective
naval districts, and the Naval Stations at Guam and Samoa.
Because military intelligence, that is, the analysis, interpretation,
and dissemination of information, was the prerogative of
the Offi ce of Naval Intelligence, it was outside the jurisdiction of
Saff ord’s Security Section of Naval Communications. Th erefore,
Saff ord’s cable was drafted in technical terms and refrained from
interpretation. 25
Saff ord then drafted a second message ordering Guam to
destroy all secret and confi dential publications and other classifi
ed matter except that essential for current purposes. . . . Be
prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classifi
ed matter you retain.
It was directed to the naval station at Guam for action, with
information copies to the commanders of the fl eets and naval
districts in the Philippines and Hawaii, who might have occasion
to communicate with Guam. 26 It was imperative that Saff ord’s
fi rst message get there fi rst, as the second message “was sent in
the new RIP 66, which had just been made eff ective by the previous
message.” Noyes revised Saff ord’s draft somewhat and softened
the “degree of warning” it contained, and it was dispatched
17 minutes after Saff ord’s fi rst message. However, it was sent
Deferred Priority, thus downgrading its urgency.
[B]y Navy regulations or by communication instructions
deferred messages are not expected to be delivered until the
25 Ibid., p. 2397.
26 Ibid., p. 2398, Serial No. 042017. See also ibid., part 14, p. 1408.