Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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Signifi cant Information Known in Washington 229 blew.” Ogimoto heard the phrase “East Wind Rain” repeated several times. In the next room Assistant Naval Attaché Yuzuru Sanematsu heard Ogimoto’s shout and rushed into the radio room. Th e room was electric with excitement. Th e two men looked at one another and said, “What had to come has fi nally come.” Th ey immediately started making preparations for the destruction of the embassy’s secret codes, ciphers, and code machines. 23 Safford (Naval Communications, Security) Alerts U.S. Outposts to Destroy Classified Documents Indications were mounting that some form of aggressive action by the Japanese was imminent. But when? Where? Saff ord was concerned for the safety of the cryptographic equipment and all the classifi ed documents at our mid-Pacifi c stations. Th e U.S. Naval Station on Guam was only 60 miles or so from Saipan, one of the islands mandated to Japan after World War I, and “according to War Plans [Guam was] not to be defended except against sabotage.” So Saff ord thought we should “clean house early there.” 24 Th erefore, when the “Winds Execute” came in on December 4, he prepared four messages to our stations in the far-western Pacifi c which were dispatched that afternoon. Th e fi rst of Saff ord’s four messages was released by his superior, Noyes, and the other three by Admiral Ingersoll. Saff ord’s 23 Yuzuru Sanematsu, Nichi-bei Joho Senki (Tokyo: Tosho Shuppansha, 1980), pp. 146, 235; 1982, pp. 191, 232. Th is paragraph is based on translations by Kentaro Nakano and Toshio Murata of pertinent passages in the autobiography of naval historian Sanematsu. At the time of the attack, Sanematsu was the ranking assistant naval attaché and chief intelligence offi cer in the Japanese embassy in Washington. After the war he was tried in the Japanese war crimes tribunal and served time in prison. 24 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 29, p. 2398, Saff ord testimony before the APHB.

230 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy fi rst message ordered Guam (more than 3,000 miles west of Hawaii) and Samoa (2,260 miles south and west of Hawaii) to destroy certain codes immediately and to substitute a new code, RIP 66, for RIP 65, then in use. It was sent Priority to Kimmel at Pearl Harbor, Hart in Manila, the commandants of their respective naval districts, and the Naval Stations at Guam and Samoa. Because military intelligence, that is, the analysis, interpretation, and dissemination of information, was the prerogative of the Offi ce of Naval Intelligence, it was outside the jurisdiction of Saff ord’s Security Section of Naval Communications. Th erefore, Saff ord’s cable was drafted in technical terms and refrained from interpretation. 25 Saff ord then drafted a second message ordering Guam to destroy all secret and confi dential publications and other classifi ed matter except that essential for current purposes. . . . Be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classifi ed matter you retain. It was directed to the naval station at Guam for action, with information copies to the commanders of the fl eets and naval districts in the Philippines and Hawaii, who might have occasion to communicate with Guam. 26 It was imperative that Saff ord’s fi rst message get there fi rst, as the second message “was sent in the new RIP 66, which had just been made eff ective by the previous message.” Noyes revised Saff ord’s draft somewhat and softened the “degree of warning” it contained, and it was dispatched 17 minutes after Saff ord’s fi rst message. However, it was sent Deferred Priority, thus downgrading its urgency. [B]y Navy regulations or by communication instructions deferred messages are not expected to be delivered until the 25 Ibid., p. 2397. 26 Ibid., p. 2398, Serial No. 042017. See also ibid., part 14, p. 1408.

Signifi cant Information Known in Washington 229<br />

blew.” Ogimoto heard the phrase “East Wind Rain” repeated<br />

several times. In the next room Assistant Naval Attaché Yuzuru<br />

Sanematsu heard Ogimoto’s shout <strong>and</strong> rushed into the radio room.<br />

Th e room was electric with excitement. Th e two men looked at<br />

one another <strong>and</strong> said, “What had to come has fi nally come.” Th ey<br />

immediately started making preparations for the destruction <strong>of</strong><br />

the embassy’s secret codes, ciphers, <strong>and</strong> code machines. 23<br />

Safford (Naval Communications, Security)<br />

Alerts U.S. Outposts to Destroy<br />

Classified Documents<br />

Indications were mounting that some form <strong>of</strong> aggressive<br />

action by the Japanese was imminent. But when? Where?<br />

Saff ord was concerned for the safety <strong>of</strong> the cryptographic<br />

equipment <strong>and</strong> all the classifi ed documents at our mid-Pacifi c<br />

stations. Th e U.S. Naval Station on Guam was only 60 miles<br />

or so from Saipan, one <strong>of</strong> the isl<strong>and</strong>s m<strong>and</strong>ated to Japan after<br />

World War I, <strong>and</strong> “according to War Plans [Guam was] not to be<br />

defended except against sabotage.” So Saff ord thought we should<br />

“clean house early there.” 24 Th erefore, when the “Winds Execute”<br />

came in on December 4, he prepared four messages to our stations<br />

in the far-western Pacifi c which were dispatched that afternoon.<br />

Th e fi rst <strong>of</strong> Saff ord’s four messages was released by his superior,<br />

Noyes, <strong>and</strong> the other three by Admiral Ingersoll. Saff ord’s<br />

23 Yuzuru Sanematsu, Nichi-bei Joho Senki (Tokyo: Tosho Shuppansha, 1980),<br />

pp. 146, 235; 1982, pp. 191, 232. Th is paragraph is based on translations by<br />

Kentaro Nakano <strong>and</strong> Toshio Murata <strong>of</strong> pertinent passages in the autobiography<br />

<strong>of</strong> naval historian Sanematsu. At the time <strong>of</strong> the attack, Sanematsu was<br />

the ranking assistant naval attaché <strong>and</strong> chief intelligence <strong>of</strong>fi cer in the Japanese<br />

embassy in Washington. After the war he was tried in the Japanese war<br />

crimes tribunal <strong>and</strong> served time in prison.<br />

24 Joint Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, part 29, p. 2398, Saff ord testimony<br />

before the APHB.

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