Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
Signifi cant Information Known in Washington 229 blew.” Ogimoto heard the phrase “East Wind Rain” repeated several times. In the next room Assistant Naval Attaché Yuzuru Sanematsu heard Ogimoto’s shout and rushed into the radio room. Th e room was electric with excitement. Th e two men looked at one another and said, “What had to come has fi nally come.” Th ey immediately started making preparations for the destruction of the embassy’s secret codes, ciphers, and code machines. 23 Safford (Naval Communications, Security) Alerts U.S. Outposts to Destroy Classified Documents Indications were mounting that some form of aggressive action by the Japanese was imminent. But when? Where? Saff ord was concerned for the safety of the cryptographic equipment and all the classifi ed documents at our mid-Pacifi c stations. Th e U.S. Naval Station on Guam was only 60 miles or so from Saipan, one of the islands mandated to Japan after World War I, and “according to War Plans [Guam was] not to be defended except against sabotage.” So Saff ord thought we should “clean house early there.” 24 Th erefore, when the “Winds Execute” came in on December 4, he prepared four messages to our stations in the far-western Pacifi c which were dispatched that afternoon. Th e fi rst of Saff ord’s four messages was released by his superior, Noyes, and the other three by Admiral Ingersoll. Saff ord’s 23 Yuzuru Sanematsu, Nichi-bei Joho Senki (Tokyo: Tosho Shuppansha, 1980), pp. 146, 235; 1982, pp. 191, 232. Th is paragraph is based on translations by Kentaro Nakano and Toshio Murata of pertinent passages in the autobiography of naval historian Sanematsu. At the time of the attack, Sanematsu was the ranking assistant naval attaché and chief intelligence offi cer in the Japanese embassy in Washington. After the war he was tried in the Japanese war crimes tribunal and served time in prison. 24 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 29, p. 2398, Saff ord testimony before the APHB.
230 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy fi rst message ordered Guam (more than 3,000 miles west of Hawaii) and Samoa (2,260 miles south and west of Hawaii) to destroy certain codes immediately and to substitute a new code, RIP 66, for RIP 65, then in use. It was sent Priority to Kimmel at Pearl Harbor, Hart in Manila, the commandants of their respective naval districts, and the Naval Stations at Guam and Samoa. Because military intelligence, that is, the analysis, interpretation, and dissemination of information, was the prerogative of the Offi ce of Naval Intelligence, it was outside the jurisdiction of Saff ord’s Security Section of Naval Communications. Th erefore, Saff ord’s cable was drafted in technical terms and refrained from interpretation. 25 Saff ord then drafted a second message ordering Guam to destroy all secret and confi dential publications and other classifi ed matter except that essential for current purposes. . . . Be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classifi ed matter you retain. It was directed to the naval station at Guam for action, with information copies to the commanders of the fl eets and naval districts in the Philippines and Hawaii, who might have occasion to communicate with Guam. 26 It was imperative that Saff ord’s fi rst message get there fi rst, as the second message “was sent in the new RIP 66, which had just been made eff ective by the previous message.” Noyes revised Saff ord’s draft somewhat and softened the “degree of warning” it contained, and it was dispatched 17 minutes after Saff ord’s fi rst message. However, it was sent Deferred Priority, thus downgrading its urgency. [B]y Navy regulations or by communication instructions deferred messages are not expected to be delivered until the 25 Ibid., p. 2397. 26 Ibid., p. 2398, Serial No. 042017. See also ibid., part 14, p. 1408.
- Page 202 and 203: 8. The Countdown Begins U.S.-Japane
- Page 204 and 205: The Countdown Begins 181 Tokyo Orde
- Page 206 and 207: The Countdown Begins 183 offi ce, w
- Page 208 and 209: The Countdown Begins 185 Pacific. .
- Page 210 and 211: The Countdown Begins 187 Th e Japan
- Page 212 and 213: The Countdown Begins 189 southeast
- Page 214 and 215: The Countdown Begins 191 Th e battl
- Page 216 and 217: The Countdown Begins 193 situation
- Page 218 and 219: The Countdown Begins 195 and Washin
- Page 220 and 221: The Countdown Begins 197 Four offi
- Page 222 and 223: The Countdown Begins 199 FDR also t
- Page 224: The Countdown Begins 201 night repo
- Page 227 and 228: 204 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 229 and 230: 206 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 231 and 232: 208 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 233 and 234: 210 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 235 and 236: 212 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 237 and 238: 214 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 239 and 240: 216 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 241 and 242: 218 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 244 and 245: 10. Significant Information Known i
- Page 246 and 247: Signifi cant Information Known in W
- Page 248 and 249: Signifi cant Information Known in W
- Page 250 and 251: Signifi cant Information Known in W
- Page 254 and 255: Signifi cant Information Known in W
- Page 256 and 257: Signifi cant Information Known in W
- Page 258 and 259: Signifi cant Information Known in W
- Page 260: Signifi cant Information Known in W
- Page 263 and 264: 240 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 265 and 266: 242 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 267 and 268: 244 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 269 and 270: 246 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 272 and 273: 12. December 6, Part 1 Collecting
- Page 274 and 275: December 6, Part 1 251 usually in t
- Page 276 and 277: December 6, Part 1 253 result of th
- Page 278 and 279: December 6, Part 1 255 Message.”
- Page 280 and 281: December 6, Part 1 257 Fleet in the
- Page 282 and 283: December 6, Part 1 259 Takagi, Ando
- Page 284 and 285: December 6, Part 1 261 fully apprec
- Page 286 and 287: December 6, Part 1 263 included all
- Page 288 and 289: December 6, Part 1 265 told him tha
- Page 290: December 6, Part 1 267 had “now r
- Page 293 and 294: 270 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 295 and 296: 272 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 297 and 298: 274 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 299 and 300: 276 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 301 and 302: 278 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
Signifi cant Information Known in Washington 229<br />
blew.” Ogimoto heard the phrase “East Wind Rain” repeated<br />
several times. In the next room Assistant Naval Attaché Yuzuru<br />
Sanematsu heard Ogimoto’s shout <strong>and</strong> rushed into the radio room.<br />
Th e room was electric with excitement. Th e two men looked at<br />
one another <strong>and</strong> said, “What had to come has fi nally come.” Th ey<br />
immediately started making preparations for the destruction <strong>of</strong><br />
the embassy’s secret codes, ciphers, <strong>and</strong> code machines. 23<br />
Safford (Naval Communications, Security)<br />
Alerts U.S. Outposts to Destroy<br />
Classified Documents<br />
Indications were mounting that some form <strong>of</strong> aggressive<br />
action by the Japanese was imminent. But when? Where?<br />
Saff ord was concerned for the safety <strong>of</strong> the cryptographic<br />
equipment <strong>and</strong> all the classifi ed documents at our mid-Pacifi c<br />
stations. Th e U.S. Naval Station on Guam was only 60 miles<br />
or so from Saipan, one <strong>of</strong> the isl<strong>and</strong>s m<strong>and</strong>ated to Japan after<br />
World War I, <strong>and</strong> “according to War Plans [Guam was] not to be<br />
defended except against sabotage.” So Saff ord thought we should<br />
“clean house early there.” 24 Th erefore, when the “Winds Execute”<br />
came in on December 4, he prepared four messages to our stations<br />
in the far-western Pacifi c which were dispatched that afternoon.<br />
Th e fi rst <strong>of</strong> Saff ord’s four messages was released by his superior,<br />
Noyes, <strong>and</strong> the other three by Admiral Ingersoll. Saff ord’s<br />
23 Yuzuru Sanematsu, Nichi-bei Joho Senki (Tokyo: Tosho Shuppansha, 1980),<br />
pp. 146, 235; 1982, pp. 191, 232. Th is paragraph is based on translations by<br />
Kentaro Nakano <strong>and</strong> Toshio Murata <strong>of</strong> pertinent passages in the autobiography<br />
<strong>of</strong> naval historian Sanematsu. At the time <strong>of</strong> the attack, Sanematsu was<br />
the ranking assistant naval attaché <strong>and</strong> chief intelligence <strong>of</strong>fi cer in the Japanese<br />
embassy in Washington. After the war he was tried in the Japanese war<br />
crimes tribunal <strong>and</strong> served time in prison.<br />
24 Joint Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, part 29, p. 2398, Saff ord testimony<br />
before the APHB.