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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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228 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

the middle <strong>of</strong> the message. . . . Kramer had underscored all three<br />

“code phrases” on the original incoming teletype sheet. Below<br />

the printed message was written in pencil or colored crayon in<br />

Kramer’s h<strong>and</strong>writing, the following free translations:<br />

War with Engl<strong>and</strong> (including NEI, etc.)<br />

War with the U.S.<br />

Peace with Russia 21<br />

Saff ord immediately sent the original teletype <strong>of</strong> the “Winds<br />

Execute” with one <strong>of</strong> his <strong>of</strong>fi cers up to the <strong>of</strong>fi ce <strong>of</strong> his superior,<br />

Rear Admiral Noyes, director <strong>of</strong> naval communications. Saff ord<br />

did not explain the message or its signifi cance to the courier; he<br />

only told him “to deliver this paper to Admiral Noyes in person.”<br />

If Noyes wasn’t there, the <strong>of</strong>fi cer was “to track him down <strong>and</strong><br />

not take ‘no’ for an answer.” If Noyes could not be found within<br />

a reasonable time, the <strong>of</strong>fi cer was to let Saff ord know. In a few<br />

minutes, however, Saff ord received a report that the message had<br />

been successfully delivered to Noyes. 22<br />

Meanwhile over at the Japanese embassy in Washington,<br />

Japanese Petty Offi cer Ogimoto, an intelligence <strong>of</strong>fi cer posing as<br />

a code clerk, had been on the alert since November 19, when<br />

the government in Tokyo had announced the “Winds Code.”<br />

We knew, <strong>of</strong> course, that the Japanese embassies <strong>and</strong> legations<br />

throughout the world must have been listening for the “Winds<br />

Execute” just as intently as we had been, although we had no way<br />

<strong>of</strong> knowing just what arrangements they had made. However, in<br />

the naval attaché room, Ogimoto had been straining his ears listening<br />

to shortwave broadcasts on their sophisticated radio. At<br />

about 4:00 p.m. on December 4, Ogimoto heard what he had<br />

been waiting for, “East Wind Rain.” He shouted out, “Th e wind<br />

21 Ibid., part 8, p. 3586, Saff ord testimony before the Joint Committee.<br />

22 Ibid. See also p. 3611 <strong>and</strong> ibid., part 18, p. 3347, the memor<strong>and</strong>um <strong>of</strong> May<br />

14, 1945, prepared by Saff ord for Lieutenant Comm<strong>and</strong>er John F. Sonnett,<br />

legal assistant to Admiral Hewitt.

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