Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

224 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
everyone in authority from the president down believed that
this [a “Winds Execute”] would be the Japanese Government’s
decision as to peace or war announced to their own offi cials
overseas.
We looked on it as “our chance of a tip-off , [our chance]
to gain the necessary time to prevent a surprise attack on our
fl eet.” 8
Interception of a “Winds Execute” was given top priority.
Saff ord immediately alerted U.S. intercept stations to monitor
Japanese-language weather and news broadcasts at the scheduled
times. 9 It was expected that the message would be transmitted
in Japanese Morse code. Th ose monitoring the broadcasts
were given cards with the three Japanese phrases listed in the
“Winds Code” message—HIGASHI NO KAZE AME, KITA
NO KAZE KUMORI, and NISHI NO KAZE HARE—and
were instructed to listen closely for an “Execute,” i.e., for an
actual broadcast of any one of the three crucial Japanese weather
phrases. 10
“Our prospects for interception looked somewhat dubious,”
Saff ord said later. 11 Th e Navy even feared that “this winds execute
might have been sent out before the 28th, when we began listening
for it 12 and that we might have missed it entirely. After all,
the Japanese message had gone out on November 15, almost two
weeks before we decoded and translated it. All these uncertainties
8 Ibid., part 8, p. 3640, Saff ord testimony before the Joint Committee.
9 Ibid., p. 3580.
10 Ibid., part 33, p. 853, Kramer testimony, September 13, 1944, at Navy Court
of Inquiry; ibid., part 8, pp. 3915–18, and ibid., part 9, pp. 4126–28, Kramer
testimony before the Joint Committee; and ibid., part 10, p. 4624, Bratton
testimony before the Joint Committee.
11 Ibid., part 8, p. 3581, Saff ord statement before the Joint Committee.
12 Ibid. p. 3640.