Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Tensions Mount 217
diplomatic code, a code machine named “Purple,” or of MAGIC,
the valuable intelligence derived from “Purple.”
McCollum’s watered-down dispatch (#031850) 35 had actually
been released by Wilkinson just fi ve minutes before Saff ord’s
(#031855). 36 McCollum’s message had been sent for action to
Hart in Manila, Kimmel in Pearl Harbor, and to the commandants
of the 14th (Hawaii) and 16th (Philippines) naval districts.
Saff ord’s message went for action to the Philippines, with an
information copy to Hawaii.
U. S. Orders Destruction of Codes
at Some Overseas Embassies
Th e repeated reminders that the Japanese were planning
some aggressive action in the very near future spurred Army offi -
cials in Washington to action. General Sherman Miles, head of
G-2, the military intelligence division of the Army general staff ,
was responsible for the collection, analysis, estimation, and dissemination
of information primarily for the chief of staff and the
secretary of war. 37 On December 3, he cabled the U.S. military
attaché at the U.S. embassy in Tokyo to destroy its codes. 38
Th e offi ce of the chief of naval operations (OPNAV) also
acted. Late in the evening of December 3, Washington time,
instructions to destroy the Navy’s codes were sent to U.S. naval
attachés in the Asiatic theater—ALUSNA (naval attaché) in
Tokyo and Bangkok, and ASTALUSNA (assistant naval attaché
for air) in Peiping and Shanghai, China. Information copies
only were sent to CINCAF (commander-in-chief, Asiatic Fleet),
that is Admiral Hart in Manila, COM 16 (commandant, 16th
35 Ibid., part 14, p. 1407.
36 Ibid., p. 1408.
37 Ibid., part 2, p. 777, Miles testimony before the Joint Committee.
38Ibid., p. 841, Miles testimony before the Joint Committee; part 29, p. 2445,
Bratton testimony before the APHB. See also part 14, p. 1409.