Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

216 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Th e C.I. [Communications Intelligence] Unit in Washington
had no authority to forward to the C.I. Units in Pearl Harbor
or Corregidor, or to the Commanders-in-Chief direct, any
information other than technical information pertaining to
direction fi nding, interception, and so forth. Th e dissemination
of intelligence was the duty, responsibility, and privilege of the
Offi ce of Naval Intelligence as prescribed in Communication
War Plans approved by the Chief of Naval Operations in
March, 1940. 31
Th erefore, the dissemination of intelligence was not permitted
to Saff ord’s unit. He acted because he “thought McCollum
had been unable to get his message released.” 32
Saff ord’s message, OpNav 031855, was “released by
Captain [ Joseph R.] Redman, Assistant Director of Naval
Communications.” It was addressed to the Philippines (CinCAF
and Com 16) for action and routed to Hawaii (CinCPac and Com
14) for information. It was “written in highly technical language
and only one offi cer present at Pearl Harbor, the late Lieutenant
H. M. Coleman, U.S.N., on CinCPac’s Staff , could have explained
its signifi cance.” 33 Saff ord’s message advised that on December 1
Tokyo had ordered London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila
to destroy their “Purple” machines; Batavia’s machine had already
been returned to Tokyo. Th en on December 2 the Japanese
embassy in Washington had been told to destroy its secret documents,
its “Purple” machine, and all but one copy of other systems.
It also reported that the Japanese embassy in London had complied.
34 When Saff ord’s message reached Pearl Harbor, Kimmel’s
intelligence offi cer had to ask Coleman what a “Purple” machine
was. Th e Pearl Harbor command had never heard of the Japanese
31 Ibid., part 26, pp. 392–93, Saff ord testimony before the Hart Inquiry.
32 Ibid., p. 392.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., part 14, p. 1408.