Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Tensions Mount 215
was dispatched priority on December 3 at 6:50 p.m. Greenwich
time (1:50 p.m., Washington time), to Admiral Hart (Manila),
Admiral Kimmel (Pearl Harbor), and to commandants of the
naval districts in Hawaii and the Philippines. 27
Navy Captain L.F. Saff ord in the Offi ce of Naval
Communications knew of the latest Japanese intercept regarding
the destruction of codes in London, Hong Kong, Singapore,
and Manila. 28 Th en he learned that the Japanese embassy in
Washington also had been ordered “to destroy everything they
had except one copy of their high-grade [decoding] machine.”
And “on the 3rd we received a signal from Admiralty London
that [the Japanese embassy in] London had already complied.” 29
Lieutenant Commander A.D. Kramer, who was attached to
the far eastern section of Naval Intelligence, told Saff ord that
McCollum was “greatly worried by the lack of information that
was being sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacifi c Fleet.”
Saff ord phoned McCollum and asked “if he had read the messages
which we had been getting in the last three days.” McCollum
said he had. “Do you appreciate their signifi cance?” Saff ord asked.
McCollum said he did. Th en Saff ord asked, “Are you people in
Naval Intelligence doing anything to get a warning out to the
Pacifi c Fleet?” “We are doing everything we can”—McCollum
emphasized both “we’s”—“to get the news out to the Fleet.” 30
Saff ord didn’t learn then that McCollum had fi nally succeeded
in having a warning sent, even if a watered-down one. So
Saff ord and Kramer set out to draft their own warning. According
to Saff ord,
27 Ibid., part 14, p. 1407, OPNAV #031850, December 3, 1941.
28 Ibid., part 12, p. 209, Tokyo to Washington #2444, December 1, 1941.
29 Ibid., part 29, p. 2396. Saff ord testimony before the APHB.
30 Ibid.