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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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214 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

<strong>of</strong> these tasks, the embassy should wire back the one code word,<br />

“haruna.”<br />

Th is code-destruct message <strong>and</strong> others addressed to Japanese<br />

embassies <strong>and</strong> consulates indicated to anyone familiar with such<br />

matters that the Japanese were planning to go to war very soon.<br />

Junior <strong>of</strong>fi cers in Naval Intelligence, who were working with<br />

these Japanese intercepts, were disturbed. Navy Captain Arthur<br />

H. McCollum, who was in charge <strong>of</strong> the Far Eastern section <strong>of</strong><br />

Naval Intelligence’s foreign branch, suggested that warning messages<br />

be sent to the U.S. outposts in the Pacifi c, <strong>and</strong> he drafted<br />

the following cable:<br />

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric<br />

<strong>and</strong> urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic<br />

<strong>and</strong> consular posts at Hongkong x Singapore x Batavia<br />

x Manila x Washington <strong>and</strong> London to destroy most <strong>of</strong> their<br />

codes <strong>and</strong> ciphers at once <strong>and</strong> to burn all other important confi<br />

dential <strong>and</strong> secret documents x From foregoing infer that<br />

Orange [ Japan] plans early action in Southeast Asia. 25<br />

McCollum’s superior, Admiral Th eodore S. Wilkinson, chief<br />

<strong>of</strong> the intelligence division, sought permission from Admiral<br />

Royal E. Ingersoll, assistant chief <strong>of</strong> naval operations, to send<br />

this cable. When asked during the <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> hearings if the<br />

destruction <strong>of</strong> codes “necessarily mean[s] war, that a country<br />

that destroys its codes is going to commit an overt act <strong>of</strong> war or<br />

declare war,” Ingersoll replied, “It meant that to us, particularly<br />

the destruction <strong>of</strong> codes in the consulates.” 26 Th erefore, Ingersoll<br />

apparently assumed that the last sentence <strong>of</strong> the proposed cable<br />

was unnecessary. In any event, he okayed the code-destruction<br />

message, with the fi nal sentence deleted. Th e shortened message<br />

25 Ibid., part 15, p. 1866, exhibit No. 83. #031850 to CINCPAC, CINCAF,<br />

Coms. 14, 16 concerning Japanese instruction to destroy codes <strong>and</strong> ciphers.<br />

26 Ibid., part 9, p. 4269, Ingersoll testimony before the Joint Committee.

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