Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

212 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Morgenthau spoke with Roosevelt again on December 3.
FDR said “he had the Japanese running around like a lot of wet
hens” and thought “the Japanese are doing everything they can to
stall until they are ready.” Morgenthau had long been anxious for
the United States to become involved in the war against Hitler, so
from Morgenthau’s viewpoint, “Th e most important thing” was
that the president was “talking with the English about war plans
as to when and where the USA and Great Britain should strike.”
When Morgenthau learned that the New York branch of
the Bank of Japan was going to close down on December 4 or
5, he became still more worried about the market for his bond
off er. He contacted the president again and fi nally got “an all
clear signal.” So on Th ursday, December 4, he announced “the
Treasury off ering—$1 billion of 2-1/2 per cent bonds maturing
1967–1972, and $500 million of 2 per cent with a shorter maturity
1951–1955.” 20
Japanese Consul in Hawaii Asked to Report
Weekly on Ships in Pearl Harbor
For some months, U.S. intelligence offi cers in Hawaii had
been intercepting Japanese messages to and from the Japanese
consul in Hawaii and Tokyo, messages sent in the J-19 (consular)
code. U.S. intelligence personnel in Hawaii did not have the facilities
to decipher these coded intercepts and were under instructions
to airmail them as they were intercepted to Washington.
Airmail from Hawaii to Washington took two or three days. 21
Once in Washington, their decoding and translation was often
delayed still further, for “Purple” messages, which usually dealt
with urgent and sensitive matters, had priority.
20 John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Urgency, 1938–
1941 (Boston: Houghton Miffl in, 1965), pp. 391–93.
21 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 2, p. 791, General Miles testimony
before the Joint Committee.