Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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Tensions Mount 211 Nelson had “a second shock” later in the week. He was giving a dinner Wednesday evening for Vice President Henry A. Wallace and had invited the members of SPAB. Wallace sat at Nelson’s right and his fellow Chicagoan, Navy Secretary Frank Knox, was on his left. Remembering the president’s presentiment of war, Nelson “made guarded inquiries of Knox concerning the Japanese situation.” Knox “was not at all reticent” in his reply. “Don,” he said, “we may be at war with the Japs before the month is over.” Nelson asked, “Is it that bad?” Knox replied, “You bet your life it’s that bad.” Th en Nelson asked Knox “what kind of a fi ght would we have out there in the Pacifi c.” Knox replied, “we’ll hunt their navy down and blow it right out of the water’.” 19 Treasury Secretary Morgenthau Asks if Anything Might Disturb a U.S. Bond Sale Treasury Secretary Morgenthau was responsible for arranging the government’s fi nancing. On December 1 he was preparing to make an off ering on the market of $1.5 billion in U.S. bonds. Before settling on a date for the off er, he wanted to know the likelihood that some crisis might occur to disturb the fi nancial markets. As Morgenthau was not privy to MAGIC, he lacked detailed inside knowledge of the international situation; he asked Roosevelt’s advice. FDR told him to go ahead with the bond off er. But he said, “I cannot guarantee anything. It is all in the laps of the gods,” adding, “it was apt to be worse in the following week than in the week just beginning.” Morgenthau also asked Welles “if something would be happening Wednesday, Th ursday, or Friday [December 3, 4, or 5] of real importance—I mean that might upset the people of this country.” Welles was reassuring: “I don’t anticipate anything within that brief period.” 19 Ibid., pp. 182–83.

212 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Morgenthau spoke with Roosevelt again on December 3. FDR said “he had the Japanese running around like a lot of wet hens” and thought “the Japanese are doing everything they can to stall until they are ready.” Morgenthau had long been anxious for the United States to become involved in the war against Hitler, so from Morgenthau’s viewpoint, “Th e most important thing” was that the president was “talking with the English about war plans as to when and where the USA and Great Britain should strike.” When Morgenthau learned that the New York branch of the Bank of Japan was going to close down on December 4 or 5, he became still more worried about the market for his bond off er. He contacted the president again and fi nally got “an all clear signal.” So on Th ursday, December 4, he announced “the Treasury off ering—$1 billion of 2-1/2 per cent bonds maturing 1967–1972, and $500 million of 2 per cent with a shorter maturity 1951–1955.” 20 Japanese Consul in Hawaii Asked to Report Weekly on Ships in Pearl Harbor For some months, U.S. intelligence offi cers in Hawaii had been intercepting Japanese messages to and from the Japanese consul in Hawaii and Tokyo, messages sent in the J-19 (consular) code. U.S. intelligence personnel in Hawaii did not have the facilities to decipher these coded intercepts and were under instructions to airmail them as they were intercepted to Washington. Airmail from Hawaii to Washington took two or three days. 21 Once in Washington, their decoding and translation was often delayed still further, for “Purple” messages, which usually dealt with urgent and sensitive matters, had priority. 20 John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Urgency, 1938– 1941 (Boston: Houghton Miffl in, 1965), pp. 391–93. 21 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 2, p. 791, General Miles testimony before the Joint Committee.

Tensions Mount 211<br />

Nelson had “a second shock” later in the week. He was giving<br />

a dinner Wednesday evening for Vice President Henry A.<br />

Wallace <strong>and</strong> had invited the members <strong>of</strong> SPAB. Wallace sat at<br />

Nelson’s right <strong>and</strong> his fellow Chicagoan, Navy Secretary Frank<br />

Knox, was on his left. Remembering the president’s presentiment<br />

<strong>of</strong> war, Nelson “made guarded inquiries <strong>of</strong> Knox concerning the<br />

Japanese situation.” Knox “was not at all reticent” in his reply.<br />

“Don,” he said, “we may be at war with the Japs before the month<br />

is over.” Nelson asked, “Is it that bad?” Knox replied, “You bet<br />

your life it’s that bad.” Th en Nelson asked Knox “what kind <strong>of</strong> a<br />

fi ght would we have out there in the Pacifi c.” Knox replied, “we’ll<br />

hunt their navy down <strong>and</strong> blow it right out <strong>of</strong> the water’.” 19<br />

Treasury Secretary Morgenthau Asks if<br />

Anything Might Disturb a U.S. Bond Sale<br />

Treasury Secretary Morgenthau was responsible for arranging<br />

the government’s fi nancing. On December 1 he was preparing to<br />

make an <strong>of</strong>f ering on the market <strong>of</strong> $1.5 billion in U.S. bonds.<br />

Before settling on a date for the <strong>of</strong>f er, he wanted to know the<br />

likelihood that some crisis might occur to disturb the fi nancial<br />

markets. As Morgenthau was not privy to MAGIC, he lacked<br />

detailed inside knowledge <strong>of</strong> the international situation; he asked<br />

Roosevelt’s advice. FDR told him to go ahead with the bond <strong>of</strong>f er.<br />

But he said, “I cannot guarantee anything. It is all in the laps <strong>of</strong><br />

the gods,” adding, “it was apt to be worse in the following week<br />

than in the week just beginning.”<br />

Morgenthau also asked Welles “if something would be happening<br />

Wednesday, Th ursday, or Friday [December 3, 4, or 5]<br />

<strong>of</strong> real importance—I mean that might upset the people <strong>of</strong> this<br />

country.” Welles was reassuring: “I don’t anticipate anything<br />

within that brief period.”<br />

19 Ibid., pp. 182–83.

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