Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Tensions Mount 207
with the top Army offi cials—Marshall, General Miles of
G-2 (Intelligence), and also General Gerow of the War Plans
Division of the general staff . Th ey were anxious to strengthen the
Philippines’ defenses and were
particularly concerned with supplies which were on the way to
the Philippines and additional big bombers which [they] were
trying to fl y over there, some of which were scheduled to start
at the end of the week.” 12
Hull had once remarked to Marshall, apropos of the discussions
he had been having with the Japanese envoys, “Th ese fellows
mean to fi ght and you will have to watch out.” 13 He
was certain that the Japanese were planning some deviltry;
and we were all wondering where the blow would strike. Th e
messages we were receiving now indicated that the Japanese
force was continuing on in the Gulf of Siam, and again we
discussed whether we would not have to fi ght if Malaya or the
Netherlands were attacked and the British or Dutch fought.
We all three thought that we must fi ght if those nations fought.
We realized that if Britain were eliminated it might well result
in the destruction or capture of the British Fleet. Such a result
would give the Nazi allies overwhelming power in the Atlantic
Ocean and would make the defense of the American Republics
enormously diffi cult if not impossible. All the reasons why it
would be necessary for the United States to fi ght, in case the
Japanese attacked either our British or Dutch neighbors in the
Pacifi c, were discusssed at length. 14
12 Ibid., part 11, p. 5427. Excerpt from Stimson diary.
13 Ibid., part 3, p. 1148. Quote from Marshall testimony.
14 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, pp. 5428–29, excerpt from
Stimson diary.