Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

206 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
you to know that we have but the choice between submission
to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. 9
Welles’s manner gave Nomura the “impression” that he
“hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th
would leave . . . room” to maneuver. It was “clear” also, from their
interview with Hull the day before
that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude
the current diffi cult situation. I [Nomura] am convinced that
they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Th erefore,
please bear well in mind this fact in your consideration of our
reply to the new American proposals. 10
Would U.S. Fight if British or Dutch
Fought in Malaya and NEI? FDR Still
Plans to Address Congress
Also on Tuesday, December 2, Roosevelt met with Knox,
Welles, and Stimson. Hull was still sick. “Th e president went
step by step over the situation” and reported, through the State
Department, on his request to the Japanese that they tell him “what
they intended by this new occupation of southern Indochina.” He
“had demanded a quick reply.” FDR seemed to have “made up his
mind to go ahead with the message to Congress and possibly also
the message to the Emperor,” as had been discussed at his War
Cabinet meeting on November 28. 11
Th ese men “were watching the situation in the Far East
very carefully.” Stimson, for one, “was in frequent conference”
9Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, Washington to Tokyo message
#1232, part 1 of 2, December 2, 1941, pp. 221–22.
10Ibid., part 12, Washington to Tokyo message #1232, part 2 of 2, December
2, 1941, pp. 221–22.
11 Ibid., part 3, p. 1148, Marshall testimony.