Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Tensions Mount 205
that this was a situation in which wise statesmanship was
needed; that wars do not settle anything . . . under the circumstances
some agreement, even though it is not satisfactory, is
better than no agreement at all. 4
Th e Japanese ambassadors reminded Welles that the note
we had handed them on November 26 contained several points
which, “in view of the actual situation in the Far East . . . the
Japanese Government would fi nd it diffi cult to accept.” Th e latest
U.S. proposal raised “important questions” so that it “seemed
to the Japanese Government to require a completely fresh start.”
As a result, its response “might take a few days,” although they
expected it “shortly.” 5
With respect to the U.S.-Japanese negotiations, the Japanese
government “had been hopeful of being able to work out with
us [the United States] some settlement of the three outstanding
points on which our draft of June 21 6 and the Japanese draft of
September 25 7 had not been reconciled.” Nomura said the situation
called for “wise statesmanship. . . . [W]ars do not settle
anything.” Kurusu thought considerable progress had been made
and he expressed an interest in resuming the eff orts to reconcile
our diff erences. Welles agreed to refer this question to Hull. 8
In their cable to Tokyo, the Japanese ambassadors reported:
Th e United States and other countries have pyramided economic
pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. . . . Th e
people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want
4 Ibid., p. 780.
5 Ibid., pp. 779–81.
6 Ibid., pp. 486–92. U.S. draft proposal to Japanese government, June 21,
1941.
7 Ibid., pp. 637–41. Japanese proposals submitted to U.S. ambassador in Japan,
September 25, 1941.
8 Department of State, Japan, 1931–1941, pp. 780–81.