Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

204 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
further aggression, since no such number of forces could possibly
be required for the policing of that region.
Such aggression could conceivably be directed against the
Philippines, the East Indies, Burma, Malaya, or Th ailand. Th is,
FDR maintained, would be “new aggression . . . additional to the
acts of aggression already undertaken against China.” He wanted
to know the intentions of the Japanese government in continuing
to move troops into Indochina “because of the broad problem
of American defense” and he asked the Japanese ambassadors
to inquire as to their government’s purpose in carrying out “this
recent and rapid concentration of troops in Indochina.” 2 Nomura
admitted that he “was not informed by the Japanese Government
of its intentions;” he would contact them immediately.
Kurusu said, “[I]t was obvious no threat against the United
States was intended,” especially as the Japanese government had
off ered on November 20 “to transfer all its forces from southern
Indochina to northern Indochina.” Th is shift “could not be easily
eff ected,” however, due to the lack of adequate transportation and
of communication facilities in Indochina. 3
Although Welles stated that the United States government
“has not had any aggressive intention against Japan,” Nomura
reminded him of the U.S. “economic measures” against Japan,
trade embargoes and the freezing of assets. “[E]conomic measures
are a much more eff ective weapon of war than military measures.”
Th e Japanese people believe “they are being placed under
severe pressure by the United States to yield to the American
position; and that it is preferable to fi ght rather than to yield to
the American position.” Th e Ambassador added
2 Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States: Japan, 1931–1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Offi ce, 1943), vol. 2, p. 779.
3 Ibid.