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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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200 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

mission was “to observe <strong>and</strong> report by radio Japanese movements<br />

in west China Sea <strong>and</strong> Gulf <strong>of</strong> Siam.” Th e three small ships were<br />

to be stationed <strong>of</strong>f the coast <strong>of</strong> French Indochina. “One vessel to<br />

be stationed between Hainan <strong>and</strong> Hue one vessel <strong>of</strong>f the Indo-<br />

China Coast between Camranh Bay <strong>and</strong> Cape St. Jacques <strong>and</strong><br />

one vessel <strong>of</strong>f Pointe de Camau,” all locations in the anticipated<br />

path <strong>of</strong> the Japanese convoys then known to be sailing toward<br />

southeast Asia. Hart was also asked to report on the reconnaissance<br />

measures—air, surface, <strong>and</strong> submarine—being performed<br />

regularly by both Army <strong>and</strong> Navy. 33<br />

Ambassador Grew Reports Gloom in Tokyo<br />

During the last few days <strong>of</strong> November, U.S. Ambassador<br />

Grew in Japan spoke with<br />

a number <strong>of</strong> prominent Japanese, some <strong>of</strong> whom have been<br />

in direct touch with the Foreign Minister, <strong>and</strong> most <strong>of</strong> them<br />

appeared to be already familiar with the substance <strong>of</strong> our<br />

Government’s recent ten-point draft proposal. While desirous<br />

<strong>of</strong> continuing the Washington conversations, they all refl ect a<br />

pessimistic reaction, perceiving the diffi culties <strong>of</strong> bridging over<br />

the positions <strong>of</strong> the two countries <strong>and</strong> emphasizing what they<br />

seem to regard as the unconciliatory “tone” <strong>of</strong> our proposal.<br />

On the evening <strong>of</strong> December 1, Grew saw one <strong>of</strong> his old<br />

Japanese friends at the Tokyo Club, looking “gray <strong>and</strong> worn.”<br />

“[T]he cabinet had decided to break <strong>of</strong>f the conversations” with<br />

the United States, he told Grew. “[I]n that case,” Grew “feared that<br />

everything was over <strong>and</strong> that [he] would soon be leaving Japan.” 34<br />

However, the government-controlled Tokyo newspapers that<br />

33 Joint Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, part 14, p. 1407. OPNAV CABLE<br />

#012356.<br />

34 Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1944),<br />

pp. 484–85.

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