Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Countdown Begins 199
FDR also told Halifax that the British “could count on
American support if we [the British] carried out our move to
defend the Kra Isthmus in the event of a Japanese attack, though
this support might not be forthcoming for a few days.” FDR then
suggested that the British promise the Th ai government that they
would respect and guarantee the “full sovereignty and independence”
of Th ailand if the Th ais “resisted Japanese attack or infi ltration.”
Roosevelt said that the U.S. Constitution did not allow
him to give such a guarantee, but he told Halifax that the British
“could be sure” that their guarantee to the Th ai government would
have “full American support.” 31
Th e president’s answer was suffi ciently encouraging to enable
Halifax to report that in his opinion the United States would
support whatever action we might take in any of the contingencies
outlined by the president. We could, in any case, count
on American support of any operations in the Kra Isthmus. 32
Hart (Manila) Directed to Charter
Three Small “Men-of-War” to
Observe Japanese Convoys
At the direction of the president, the Navy sent a cable about
7:00 p.m. on December 1 to Admiral Hart, commander-in-chief
of our Asiatic Fleet, based at Manila. Hart was asked to charter
three small vessels “as soon as possible and within two days if possible”
to form a “defensive information patrol.” Th ese three small
ships were to have the minimal requirements to be classifi ed as
“U.S. men-of-war.” Each was to be commanded by a U.S. naval
offi cer, although the crew members could be Filipinos. For weapons,
they needed only a small gun and one machine gun. Th eir
31 Ibid., pp. 186–87.
32 Birkenhead, Halifax, p. 529.