Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

198 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
“whenever and wherever they can . . . should assume the off ensive
against Japanese naval forces and sea communications.” In addition
to defending its base in Manila, the U.S. Asiatic Fleet was
to transfer some of its cruisers with aviation units and destroyers
“towards Singapore . . . to operate under [the] strategic direction”
of the commander-in-chief, Chin. 28
Th e situation in southeast Asia was becoming increasingly
precarious. Large contingents of Japanese troops were moving in
that direction. Th e government of the Netherlands East Indies
“had ordered a comprehensive mobilization of its armed forces.” 29
Halifax had been instructed by his government to tell the U.S.
government that it “expected a Japanese attack on Th ailand, and
that this attack would include an expedition to seize strategic
points in the Kra Isthmus” (the narrow strip of land belonging
to Th ailand north of the Malay Peninsula and Singapore).
Th e British “proposed to counter this plan by a rapid move into
the Isthmus,” and they “wanted to be sure . . . [of ] American
support.” 30
Roosevelt told Halifax that “[i]n the case of a direct attack” on
the British or the Dutch, “we should obviously all be together.”
However, he wanted to explore some situations which might not
be quite so clear, for instance, if there were not a “direct attack”
on the British or Dutch, or if the Japanese moved into Th ailand
without attacking the Kra Isthmus. When Halifax reported this
conversation to his government, he said “he thought the United
States would support whatever action we might take in any of
these cases.”
28 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 15, pp. 1564, 1568–69, American-Dutch-British
agreement, pp. 13, 17, 18.
29 Department of State, Far East: 1941, p. 701.
30 Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London:
Her Majesty’s Stationery Offi ce, 1962), pp. 185–86.