Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Countdown Begins 197
Four offi ces—London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila—
were told to destroy their code machines and codes; the offi ce in
the United States was told specifi cally to retain its machines and
machine codes. When a government orders the destruction of the
code machines at its diplomatic offi ces in certain countries, that is
a strong indication that a break in relations with those countries
is imminent. Th e offi cials who were reading MAGIC intercepts
realized the signifi cance of these cables.
FDR Assures British Ambassador Halifax of
U.S. Support in Southeast Asia
Because of the sense of growing emergency, Roosevelt had
returned suddenly from Warm Springs to Washington. On the
afternoon of December 1, he and his close aide Harry Hopkins
met for a “long interview” with British Ambassador Lord Halifax
at the White House. Both Halifax and FDR had considered
sending a joint British-American statement to the Japanese, but
rejected the idea as they expected it would only evoke an evasive
reply from Japan. 27 Halifax was concerned about whether the
United States would lend support to the British in southeast Asia,
as agreed during the American-Dutch-British conversations at
Singapore in April. As a signatory to the ADB agreement, the
United States was committed to engage in “active military counter-action”
in the event of “a direct act of war by Japanese armed
forces against the Territory or Mandated Territory of any of the
Associated Powers.”
Th e geographical area encompassed by this pact covered large
portions of southeast Asia and the southwest Pacifi c. Th e details
as to how “active military counteraction” was to be undertaken had
not been specifi cally spelled out. However, the ADB agreement
did specify that the U.S. Pacifi c Fleet headquartered in Hawaii
27 Earl of Birkenhead, Halifax (Boston: Houghton Miffl in, 1966), pp. 528–29.