Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Countdown Begins 195
and Washington. “[I]n spite of the sincere eff orts of the Imperial
Government,” the negotiations “now stand ruptured—broken. . . .
In the face of this our Empire faces a grave situation and must
act with determination.” Th e ambassador was asked to “immediately
interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister
RIBBENTROP and confi dentially communicate to them a summary
of the developments.” He should describe the “provocative
attitude” of England and the United States and the plan of the
British and Americans to move military forces into East Asia. He
should say that this makes it inevitable that Japan
counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that
there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out
between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some
clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this
war may come quicker than anyone dreams.
In part 3 of this three-part cable, 24 the ambassador was to
reassure the German offi cials, if questioned about Japan’s attitude
toward their common enemy under the Tripartite Pact, the
Soviets with whom the Nazis were then engaged in a fi erce struggle
to reach Moscow, that Japan did
not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if
Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States
and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her
with all our might; however right now, it is to our advantage
to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to
refrain from any direct moves in the north.
After speaking with the Germans, the ambassador was to
have an Italian translation of this cable transmitted to Hitler’s
ally, Premier Mussolini, and his Foreign Minister Ciano.
To the Japanese, the breakdown in negotiations with the
United States meant war. And they were telling their German
24 Ibid., pp. 204–05. #985 (Part 3 of 3).