Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

194 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Honolulu Press Reports U.S.-Japanese
Conversations Continuing
A report of the Japanese ambassadors’ December 1 meeting
with Hull appeared in the newspapers, including the Honolulu
papers, where it was seen by Kimmel and Short. Th e two Pearl
Harbor commanders had no way of knowing what was going on
behind the scenes, except as they were informed by Washington.
Short had received Stimson’s November 27 cable, sent out over
Marshall’s signature, telling him that “Negotiations with Japan
appear to be terminated . . . with only the barest possibilities that
the Japanese government might come back and off er to continue.”
Kimmel “was told on November 27 that negotiations had ceased
and 2 days later that they appeared to be terminated with the barest
possibilities of their resumption.” Neither Kimmel nor Short
had received any further offi cial report of the situation, and then,
as Kimmel said, they “were left to read public accounts of further
conversations between the State Department and the Japanese
emissaries in Washington which indicated that negotiations had
been resumed.” 22 Th ey could only assume that the report they had
received of a break in negotiations had been superseded.
Japan Alerts Berlin of Impending
“Clash of Arms” with Anglo-Saxon Nations
On December 1, our Navy cryptographers intercepted,
decoded, and translated two November 30 messages from the
Japanese government to its ambassador in Germany. Th ese were
long cables, sent in “Purple,” asking the ambassador in Berlin to
notify Japan’s allies under the Tripartite Alliance (Germany and
Italy) of the breakdown in negotiations with the United States.
Th ese cables were sent in three parts. Th e fi rst part 23 reported
to the ambassador the status of the conversations between Tokyo
22 Ibid., part 6, p. 2548, Kimmel statement presented to the Joint Committee.
23 Ibid., part 12, p. 204. #985 (Part 1 of 3).