Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Countdown Begins 193
situation contributes largely to the indecision of her leaders.
Th is is a problem which she must solve within then next few
months.
A basic assumption of Miles’s memorandum, in spite of
United States’ offi cial neutrality, was that we were “committed to
the defeat of Nazi Germany.” He wrote matter-of-factly about
“the continued progress of America from neutrality towards participating
in the war.” Miles acknowledged that the “Kurusu conference,”
the negotiations between the Japanese ambassadors and
our State Department, “can now be said defi nitely to have ended
in failure.” Yet he did not appear to view this rupture with particular
concern. Nor did he refl ect the sense of urgency that pervaded
much of Washington at that time—including the members
of FDR’s War Council or Cabinet and some of those who
were working with the Japanese intercepts, notably McCollum in
naval intelligence and Saff ord in naval communications.
Miles realized that the United States’s “consultative association”
with the British and the Netherlands East Indies “for the
defense of Malaysia” made us “a possible belligerent” in that area.
He knew that the “increasing amount of equipment” we were
sending China pitted us directly against Japan. Miles also recognized
Japan’s “perilous [economic] plight.” After analyzing all
these various factors, he concluded that the intentions of Japan
were not predictable. Our economic blockade of Japan and our
military forces in the Pacifi c, Miles wrote,
are primary deterrents against Japanese all-out entry in the war
as an Axis partner. If we become involved in war with Japan,
we could launch a serious off ensive against her by Naval and
Air Forces based on the Philippines and elsewhere in Malaysia.
But such an attack would fall short of a major strategic off ensive
because . . . it would be a diversion of forces away from
rather than toward our objective, the defeat of the Nazis.